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Voiceless Submission or Deliberate Choice? 
European Integration and the Relation between 
National and European Identity
M ax H aller
The coming into existence of the European Union can be considered as a lar­
ge scale experim ent in social and political integration with historically unique 
features: (1) it is one of the largest in terms of the num bers of countries and 
people involved; (2) it is occurring peacefully, with the voluntary agreement of 
all participating governments; (3) it involves only states with dem ocratic sys­
tem s of governm ent. All these characteristics indicate tha t the process of 
E u ro p ean  in tegration  m ust be considered as a secular achievem ent on this 
continent which has experienced massive and destructive wars in the last hun­
dred years. Yet, it is also clear that this process shows characteristics which 
might raise doubts about its success and about the supposedly positive conse­
quences which are expected to flow from it. Given the very different conse­
quences of other large scale experiments in political and socio-economic inte­
gration, it is essential to pinpoint potentially problematic consequences. In this 
contribution, I will focus on one possible reason for outcomes which might not 
be expected by many of the actors involved in this process. This is the fact that 
the governm ents and the people of different E uropean  nation states in part 
expect rather different outcomes from the same process of integration.
This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, the issues of national iden­
tity and E u ro p ean  in tegration  are discussed from a m ore general point of 
view. For this purpose, the concepts of «nation» and «national identity» are in­
troduced and defined, as well as their relation to «European identity». In the 
second part, a typology of the different outlooks of the individual nation states 
and their citizens towards the E uropean Union is developed. Empirical data 
from different sources, large-scale international population surveys, results of 
Referenda, official declarations are used in order to show the existence of these 
differing expectations regarding European integration. In the concluding re­
marks, the im plications of these findings for the further developm ent of the 
European Union are discussed.
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1 N a tio n a l id e n tity  an d  its re la tio n  to  E u ro pean  in te g ra tio n
1.1 The present-day relevance of the concepts of nation 
and national identity
In recent decades, fundamental transformations have been occurring in the so­
cial, economic and political situation of Europe, its nation states and regions. 
With the M aastricht Treaty fo r  the European Union (1992), W estern European 
integration reached a new stage. The full realisation of the «four freedoms» in 
the m arket sphere -  unlimited exchange and m ovem ent of goods, services, la­
bour and capital within the European Union -  and the introduction of the mo­
netary  union with the common currency, the Euro, at the end of the decade, 
constitute epochal achievem ents which will profoundly reshape the future of 
this continent. In Eastern Europe, the late Eighties and early Nineties brought 
the downfall of the com m unist regim es and the rem oval of the Iron  C urtain 
which had constituted an unnatural barrier running through the heart o f this 
continent. W hile these historical events have been occurring in E urope, a 
world-wide process of globalisation has also been taking place which means 
that private and business travel and tourism, economic relations and transac­
tions, cultural and scientific communication through mass media, Internet and 
other means, are beginning to embrace the whole world. As a consequence, the 
autonom y and sovereignty of nation states is being significantly underm ined, 
and many people begin to think about alternatives to this globalisation (Galli 
1991; Knieper 1991; W ehner 1992).
In spite of these developments, however, there is no indication that the prob­
lems of national autonomy and independence are disappearing from the agen­
das of E urope and of the present-day world as a whole. The downfall of the 
com m unist regim es in the Czech Republic, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
has led to the em ergence of m ore than a dozen new nation states, som e of 
which were p repared  to fight for their independence. B ut even in W estern 
Europe, movements for more local political and cultural autonomy, or even for 
the independence and secession of whole regions -  in Spain, Belgium, Scot­
land and Italy -  are gaining ground. Strong subnational regions, such as Bava­
ria and Catalonia, are quite critical not only of their national capitals, but also 
of all trends toward a new centralisation at the EU-level in Brussels. The pro­
cess of regional, ethnic and national revival is therefore not simply a rem nant 
of traditional patterns of localism and parochialism, but must be considered as 
a concomitant of the process of modernisation itself. Many aspects of this pro­
cess lead towards a revival of regional, ethnic and national movements. We can 
m ention here, for example, the expansion of middle and higher education to 
include larger segments of the general population; the revival by scientists, his­
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torians and intellectuals of traditional languages, customs and cultures (which 
had often already passed out of use); the increasing political education and cri­
tical participation (or abstention) of citizens in political affairs; and the grow­
ing com petition of nation states, regions and cities for industrial investments 
from multinational corporations (see also van Deth 1995).
I would like to  argue, then, tha t the nation  sta te  -  in spite of the tendencies 
which seem to underm ine its po ten tia l for action -  rem ains one of the most 
im portan t actors at the level of regional, state and in ternational political af­
fairs. This is so not least because to date, there  exists no alternative -  a fact 
which is simply overlooked by proponents of the globalisation thesis (M artin/ 
Schum ann 1996). If m ultinational corporations, financiers, brokers and specu­
lators are able to put whole nationstates and national banks under pressure, 
they can do so only because no adequate means of international political con­
trol of their actions have so far been developed.
W estern E urope seems to have responded in an adequate way to these new 
problem s by beginning to integrate the continent into a wholly new kind of 
econom ic and political union. In fact, it is the first time in its history that the 
countries of W estern and Central Europe have entered  into such a close a re ­
lationship that an arm ed conflict betw een them  seems impossible to imagine 
in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, I would like to argue that at present, 
the E uropean  political elites have no clear and coherent idea of the ultim ate 
goal of European integration toward which they should move. The integration 
achievem ents in economic terms have not been aspired to for their own sake, 
but primarily for political reasons. Only if Europeans are able to develop a clear 
concept about the final form of political integration will this provide for long- 
lasting, fruitful co-operation, a balance of interests betw een its nation states, 
and a peaceful role for Europe in the wider world. A very useful tool for hel­
ping us to understand these problems is the concept of «identity». Let us look 
m ore closely at its significance for the process of European integration.
1.2 The significance of the issue of identity for the European Union
The problem of identity constitutes a central issue of the European U nion.1 In 
the M aastricht Treaty fo r  the European Union, the concept of «identity» is 
m entioned explicitly in the Preamble and in several paragraphs:
1 In this section, I am following closely the argum ents in a recen t publication  by Pfetsch (1997: 97ff.; see also 
W eidenfeld 1985; D elanty  1995).
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Preamble: The undersigned, resolved to implement a common foreign and se­
curity policy including the eventual fram ing of a com m on defence policy, 
which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the E uro­
pean identity  and its independence in o rder to prom ote peace, security and 
progress in E urope and in the world, ( ...)  have decided to establish a E u ro ­
pean Union (...).
Art. B:The Union shall set itself the following objectives: 
to assert its identity on the in ternational scene, in particular through the im ­
plem entation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual 
fram ing of a com m on defence policy, which might in time lead to a common 
defence;
Art. F .l:T he  Union shall respect the national identities of its M em ber States, 
whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy.
W hat is «national identity», and what could a «E uropean  identity» be? As 
Pfetsch (1997: 97) rightly observes, all of the above-quoted statem ents show 
that the identity concept of the European Union is primarily related to foreign 
policy, but not to positive self-determ ination concerning its in ternal affairs. 
The same is true for the D ocum ent on European Identity  passed by the For­
eign Ministers of the European Community in 1973. In this document, too, the 
Community is defined primarily in terms of its relation to the other countries 
of the world. A t the centre of E uropean identity are «its common heritage, its 
own interests, the particular obligations of the community.» It is stated that the 
Europe of the Nine is conscious of the world-political obligations which spring 
from its unification, that this unification is not directed against anybody else, 
and that the E uropean  Com m unity will play an active role in world politics. 
Concerning the evolution of a European identity, the document states (Pfetsch 
1997:98, my translation from German):
The developm ent of a European identity will follow the dynamics of the 
work of E uropean  unification. In their foreign relations, the Nine will 
be anxious to determ ine their identity in relation to the other political 
units step by step. In this way, they consciously strengthen their internal 
unity and contribute to the formulation of a truly European politics.
This seems to be a rather vague, if not empty definition. And, indeed, its vacuity 
has been proven in practical experience, which has shown that the European 
Community and the E uropean Union are still far from being able to follow a 
determ ined common foreign policy. Significant examples of this weakness are 
the passive and dissenting political role which the E uropean  U nion and its
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mem ber states played in two profound crises which more or less directly affec­
ted Europe: the occupation of Kuweit by Iraq and the subsequent Gulf war in 
1991, and the social and political disin tegration  and subsequent civil war in 
Yugoslavia in the early N ineties. In the la tte r case, the lack of unanim ity 
among the major W estern European states -  the early recognition of the inde­
pendence of Slovenia and C roatia  by G erm any, in contrast to France and 
England and m ost of the o ther E U -states -  was directly connected with the 
ou tbreak  of war in Yugoslavia and Bosnia. In the G ulf war, m ost E u ropean  
leaders w ere initially opposed to the all-out military invasion of Iraq  by the 
U nited States (which, as we know today, resulted in the deaths of over 100000 
Iraqi soldiers, but did not overthrow  the dictatorial governm ent of Saddam  
Hussein).
In both cases, the lack of unanimity among the leading politicians of the mem­
ber states of the EU  has led to a deep disillusionment among European popu­
lations about their leaders and about the prospects of arriving at a coherent 
and efficient policy of the E uropean Union in the face of serious political cri­
ses (A rnold 1993; Newhouse 1998: 93 ff.).Thus, in regard to the action poten­
tial of the E uropean  U nion in its foreign relations, we must conclude: G reat 
hopes have been awakened, but little has so far been achieved. Why is this the 
case? I would like to suggest that this failure is closely connected to the lack of 
unanim ity and precision among the m em ber states over the anticipated ulti­
m ate shape of its internal institutional structure. This institutional structure is 
in turn closely related to the concepts of national and European identity.
1.3 The concepts of «nation» and «national identity»
In order to understand the astonishing contradiction betw een the success of 
the Union in achieving economic integration2, and its profound difficulty in ar­
riving at a common «foreign policy», we have to look more closely at the con­
cepts of «nation» and «national identity». What is a nation and a nation state, 
and what might a «European nation» be? We can distinguish two main appro­
aches to this concept (see Haller 1996). The first may be called the ontological- 
substantivist approach. This approach posits that we can enum erate a series of
2 If I use the w ord «success» here, I in tend it to deno te only the progress tow ards the realisation o f econom ic 
and m arket in teg ra tion , the in troduction  o f the com m on currency, etc. W hether o r n o t this econom ic in te­
gra tion  overa ll can be considered  a success, in th e  sense o f having con trib u ted  significantly  to  econom ic 
progress, increase of w ealth , etc. can only be decided  after several decades. A t least in one im p o rtan t res­
pect -  the high and p ers is ten t ra tes  o f unem ploym ent in the E u ropean  U nion  -  econom ic in teg ra tion  has 
not been successful. For discussions o f the po ten tia l negative effects of in teg ration  from  the econom ic and 
p o litic a l-dem ocratic  p o in t o f  view, see  K ohr (1983); C u tle r  e t al. (1989); severa l co n trib u tio n s  to  W eber 
(1991).
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attributes which together constitute a nation if they are fully present. Anthony 
Smith (1991) gives a ra ther exhaustive list of the relevant com ponents: com­
m on history and territory, an «ethnic core», a com m on culture, a developed 
and in tegrated  economy, and a coheren t constitutional and political system. 
The strength of this definition is that it clearly indicates all those factors which 
in fact characterise most nations; at the same time, we can find existing nations 
which lack at least one of these criteria, and this shows that none of them  is in­
dispensable to the existence of a nation.
A gainst this characterisation, I would prefer to define nation as a self-chosen 
object o f  political identification (a political community) whose members aspire 
to become politically independent or politically self-determined. There are three 
essential elem ents in this definition: the first is the understanding of a nation 
as a political community, not just as a bureaucratic apparatus or a system ba­
sed simply on power. The second is the fact that its elites and populations have 
the will to determ ine their own fate (see also H eller 1934; W eber 1964: 313, 
675; E lw ert 1999). A nation in this sense will tend to becom e an independent 
state (if it is not yet one), but it can also confine itself to gaining extensive po­
litical autonomy within an existing nation state (as, for example, Catalonia has 
done). Central to this concept of nation is, therefore, a third elem ent, the idea 
of legitimacy: A well-established nation-state enjoys a high degree of approval 
from its citizens, they are prepared to engage themselves in the political affairs 
of their political community, and they would even be willing to defend the na­
tion against any attack from outside.
Such a concept of «nation» can be used both as an explanatory, independent 
variable and as a dependent variable (in this regard, we can speak of differing 
degrees of nationhood). Thus, a nation is not defined as a m ore or less clearly 
circum scribed (ontological) entity, but ra ther as a social and politically re le­
vant idea (idee directrice, as Hauriou has called it) or as a field o f  forces (Kraf- 
tefeld). The idea behind the general concept of «identity» is that a person or a 
nation with a strongly developed self-image or identity will behave in a much 
more consistent and forceful way than one which does not have such an iden­
tity (H aberm as 1976: 92 ff.). With the concept of national identity, it becomes 
possible to see how nations can use or even create their own g reat history, 
their common language and culture, and their self-preserving economy. It can 
also be easily understood how nations can establish their claims to indepen­
dence or their right to continue to exist, even if they seem non-viable from an 
economic point of view. Again, it can be seen why nations whose pride has been 
wounded, are able to follow irresponsible nationalistic and chauvinistic leaders 
(Scheff 1994). We can observe and investigate empirically to what extent fac­
tors such as a common culture, an integrated economy and the like, can contri­
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bute to the arousal of national sentiments and, eventually, to the emergence of 
new nations.
The concepts of «nation» and «national identity» com prise two dim ensions 
which have to be systematically distinguished from each other (see Synopsis
i) .T h e  first dim ension includes three components: cognitive goals, actions or 
experiences re la ted  to the nation, and em otional attachm ent to a nation; the 
second dim ension concerns the distinction between the micro and macro le­
vels. A t both levels, similar issues and questions arise. With respect to the cen­
tral aims and the self-image of a nation, we can ask, for instance: W hat kind of 
self-im age is developed and propounded  by the political leaders and by the 
cultural elites of a nation (macro level)? How are these official aims and ima­
ges reflected in the minds of their populations (micro level)? How are national 
symbols and ways of thinking transm itted  to individual feelings and b eh a­
viours (Billig (1995) shows the forcefulness of such processes).
Synopsis 1: The two dimensions of «nation» and «national identity»
Cognitive
component
Component of action 
and experience
Emotional-affective
component
Macro
Level
«Official» ideas, 
self-images and 
aims concerning 
the nation; perceived 
economic, political 
and cultural interests 
of the nation
Official politics and 
other actions con­
cerning the foundation, 
maintenance and 
strengthening of 
the nation
Official symbols 
of the nation 
(national holidays, 
arms and flags, 
memorial days, etc.)
Micro
Level
images and 
expectations of 
the individual 
members of a 
nation concerning 
their political 
community
Nation-related 
experiences of the 
individual members 
of the nation-state
Emotional 
attachment of the 
individual 
members toward 
the nation
Let us now look at the central topic of this contribution, namely, the question 
of how the individual European nations and the national identities of their ci­
tizens are related to the new potential nation of the European Community.
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1.4 Relationships between national identity and European identity
T hree hypotheses concerning the re lation  betw een local-regional identities 
and national identity can be distinguished (H aller et al. 1996: 384 ff.). These 
hypotheses, which I have developed elsew here in the context of A ustria, can 
also be applied to the relations between national and European identity.
First, there is the possibility of a neutral relation between the two. This would 
mean that European integration will not affect the identity of the single nation 
states and their citizens. This hypothesis can probably be excluded im m ediate­
ly, since European integration affects both the action potential and the au to ­
nomy of nation states at the level of governm ents as well as the daily lives of 
their citizens in many ways. It is very significant here that the introduction of 
the common currency, the Euro, has been motivated explicitly by political con­
siderations. It is expected (and hoped) that a common currency will function 
as an efficient sym bol of European unity, and that in so doing, it will strength­
en European identity among the citizens of the mem ber states.
The second thesis posits that there  exists a com plem entary relationship  b e ­
tween national and E uropean  identity. This thesis may be considered as the 
«official doctrine» of the national governm ents and the EU -bureaucrats and 
politicians. It is well known that they never tire of swearing to the Europeans 
that integration will not lead to an elimination of the individual nation states. 
R a ther, it is said, it will only com plem ent national identity  and, in the final 
analysis, that it will even be necessary for the preservation of the ir indepen­
dence in a changing world. This is certainly an attractive hypothesis. As long as 
the constitution of the European Union considers the individual nation states 
as essential components of its system, these components will not be wholly as­
similated into a new super-state. From this point of view, the European Union 
would have to declare itself clearly as a state o f  nationalities or a union o f  nation 
states (N ationalitätenstaat) ra ther than as a new nation state in its own right 
(on these concepts, see also Francis 1965; Lepsius 1988, 1992; H aller 1995,
1996). H istorical research on the em ergence of the E uropean  U nion shows 
that such an interpretation approxim ates to the reality. According to Milward 
(1992:18), European integration was not an overriding of the nation state but 
a conscious «creation of the E uropean nationstates themselves for their own 
purposes», an effort to preserve their action poten tia l in a globalised world. 
Europe can be considered as an emergent nation if a nation is not understood 
as a «close-knit political and cultural unit» -  such as Britain, France or G er­
m any -  but as «a com plex and vast entity, such as India» (Friedrich  1969: 
213f.).
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In so far as this description is true, the feeling of being a mem ber of the Union 
could well develop among the citizens of the single nation states alongside a 
continuation of their nation state consciousness (Nationalstaatsbewusstsein). 
That both feelings can co-exist quite well, or that they could even strengthen 
each other, is proved by theoretical and empirical sociological considerations. 
From the theoretical point of view, it has been argued that m odern men and 
women are characterised  by the ir capacity to develop m ultiple identities -  
identities which, to a considerable degree, they can choose them selves (Sim- 
mel 1923; von Krockow 1970). From the empirical point of view, it is a fact that 
in countries with federal political systems -  like Germany, Switzerland or Aus­
tria -  a strong local-regional identity is combined positively with a sense of na­
tional pride and identity (Bruckmtiller 1996; Haller et al. 1996).
There is no guarantee, however, that national and European identity will go 
together in such a sm ooth and conflict-free fashion. A  third hypothesis, posit­
ing a com petitive or exclusive relationship  betw een the two, must also be se­
riously considered. The main argum ent in favour of this hypothesis is that a 
strong national identity can only survive the process of European integration 
if it is re la ted  to continuing and positive political experiences and the provi­
sion of services by the nation states to its citizens. If European integration sig­
nificantly underm ines the autonom ous action potential of individual nation 
states, this would in the long run also undermine the attachm ent of individual 
citizens to their state. Such tendencies are obvious. They are the o ther side of 
the coin of the aforem entioned  success of integration: the loss of the action 
poten tia l of national governm ents; the reduction of national parliam ents to 
the role of m ere «state notaries»  rubber stam ping the decrees enacted by 
Brussels; the loss of significant national symbols; the trends toward a linguis­
tic-cultural homogenisation of Europe, etc. The thesis of an evolutionary drive 
towards E uropean integration (Cam pbell 1994) sees such tendencies as more 
or less necessary reactions to and outcomes of world-wide processes. National 
governm ents, as well as individual citizens, however, might fear such tenden­
cies and therefore oppose European integration.3
The central question to be investigated in the following section is therefore: To 
what extent are national identity and European integration and identity com­
plem entary to or competitive with each other? My general hypothesis here is 
that the m ore the new E uropean  institutions are able to preserve significant 
action potentials for nation states, or to restrict themselves to the function of
3 These trends can be perceived m ost sharp ly  in France, whose language has experienced a secular decline in 
in ternational usage com pared  with English. This led the French parliam ent to  enact a «Law for the p ro tec ­
tion o f the French language» in 1994 (D er Fischer W eltalm anach ‘95:259).
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complementing but not replacing nation states, the more it will be possible for 
national and European identity to develop in a complementary way.
As a corollary of this hypothesis, we need to investigate the predom inant vi­
sions of the future shape of the European Union, and their relation to the ima­
ges and expectations which are entertained by the single nation states. In this 
respect, I would like to propose the following three more specific theses:
1) We can see no consistent or coherent image or vision of a «European na­
tion» among the present-day political elites of Europe. R ather, there  exist 
significant differences in their ideas, both among political leaders and elites 
in different E uropean nation states, and between different political parties, 
as well as between the economic, political and cultural elites.
2) In so far as such visions do exist, we must say that the actual strategies and 
behaviours of the political elites do not correspond to  them  in any cohe­
rent way.
3) There also exist considerable divergences in the visions about E urope 
among leaders and elites on the one side, and the populations at large on 
the o ther side (see also Bach 1993; G iesen 1993; Puntscher-R iekm ann 
1998). Political leaders typically a ttribu te  the  relatively m odest popular 
support for their efforts at integration to a lack of inform ation among the 
population, or they imply that European integration can only be a m atter 
of emotions among «ordinary people».
Bearing these general rem arks in mind, we can now proceed to the develop­
m ent of a typology and the presentation of some em pirical data on the diffe­
rent images of E urope in different nation states and among elites and popula­
tions at large.
1.5 Interests behind and functions of European integration
European integration fulfils different purposes for different nation states and 
social groups and people. The first step towards an explanation is to concep­
tualise these different functions in a typology. This typology has been develo­
ped by systematically combining (a) the structural positions and in terests of 
different social groups and nation states with (b) the ideas, values and aims as­
sociated with this process of European integration. Behind this procedure lies 
the idea of sociology as a science of social reality (W irklichkeitswissenschaft), 
which sees its m ain aim as being the elaboration  of system atic relationships 
betw een interests, values, and institutions. In elaborating such relationships, it 
does not aim at the developm ent or testing of very general theories (as the na­
tural sciences do). R ather, it aims at understanding and interpreting social p ro­
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cesses in a reflexive way, that is, by taking into consideration the aims of the 
actors themselves, their historical and structural constraints, and universal ideas 
and values (see Weber 1964; Lepsius 1988; Haller 1999a).
I start from the assumption that we can identitfy at least three main interests 
or motives behind European integration:
1) Economic interests, particularly concerning economic growth, enlargem ent 
of markets, improvement of the supply of goods and services, and the like.
2) Political interests, which can be subdivided into th ree m ore specific in te ­
rests: (a) the interest in maintaining a lasting peace in Europe; (b) the inte­
rest (mainly of the political elites) in an enlargem ent of the free scope of 
their political action at home; and (c) the interest (again mainly of the poli­
tical elites) in the regaining of world power for Europe.
3) Cultural interests in the preservation of the  C hristian O ccident (A bend- 
land).
In attem pting to relate these motives and interests to the specific structural 
conditions in different European countries and regions and to different social 
groups, we may begin by distinguishing the following five functions of E u ro ­
pean integration:
1) European integration as a prop or a crutch which should help to overcome 
domestic insecurities, dependencies on other nations, and enduring econo­
mic and political problems which cannot be solved by the national political 
elites within the context of their single nation state alone.
2) European integration as a necessary evil which is assumed to be unavoida­
ble, given a lack of viable alternatives.
3) European integration as the creation o f  a new kind o f  bureaucratised super­
state which must be rejected.
4) European integration as a substitute for a weak sense o f  national identity.
5) European integration as a positive vehicle fo r  the realisation o f  particular 
economic, political and/or cultural interests.
My thesis is that strategies (1) through (4) constitute a problem atic basis for 
the development of a stable and enduring European identity. Strategies subsu- 
m able under (5) are problem atic if they are not declared and openly discus­
sed. A  corollary of the latter point is that the m ore such interests and s tra te­
gies are in the interests only of particular groups, especially elites (economic, 
political and cultural elites), the less openly they tend to be discussed. I will 
come back to these theses at the end of this essay. In the next section, m ore 
detailed justifications of these theses are given, together with some empirical 
evidence concerning the relations between national and European identity.
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2 F u n ctio ns o f E u ro pean  in te g ra tio n  fo r d iffe ren t n a tio n -s ta te s  
and socia l g roups. A  so c io lo g ic a l ty p o lo g y
In this section, I will show that these strategies can really be detected  in the 
presen t-day  process of E u ropean  in tegration . Throughout these considera­
tions, we need to look both at the macrosocial, official level of politics, and at 
the microsocial level of the perceptions and attitudes of the individual m em ­
bers of the different E uropean  populations (on the variations see also Estel/ 
M ayer 1994; T herborn  1995; D eflem /Pam pel 1996; Pfetsch 1997; Schauer
1997).
2.1 European integration as a prop or a crutch
Several countries look to  E uropean  in tegration  prim arily  in the  hope that 
through the process of in tegration , dom estic problem s can be solved which 
they have been unable to solve by themselves in their post-war history. There 
are two main areas in which E uropean  in tegration  m ight serve as a panacea 
for nation states.
First, in economic terms: Countries lying somewhat behind the «European core» 
in term s of socio-economic developm ent (G N P/capita), and characterised by 
persistent socio-economic problems, such as unem ploym ent, high public defi­
cits and/or periodic high rates of inflation, expect that the process of economic 
integration will provide a spur to accelerate economic growth, ensure the eco­
nomic catching-up and the reduction of economic crisis phenomena.
Second, in political terms: Countries lying behind in term s of «democratic m a­
turity» expect that membership in the European Union will help them to over­
come their problems in this regard. Two kinds of problems are relevant here:
-  Three Southern European countries experienced dictatorial regimes in the 
post-w ar period, until the  m id-Seventies. This was the case in Portugal, 
Spain and Greece. In fact, it was a condition of admission to the E uropean 
U nion tha t dem ocratic political regim es w ere established in these coun­
tries, which in turn hope that EU -m em bership will serve as a kind of gua­
rantee of their democratic maturing.
A nother country, Italy, has been characterised throughout the post-war pe­
riod by a rather unstable political situation. This is reflected most clearly in 
the fact that Italy has had over fifty governm ents betw een 1945 and  1998; 
the m ean duration of a governm ent in pow er was less than one year. This 
instability is also reflected in the fact that Italy is characterised by very high
Voiceless Submission or Deliberate Choice? 275
levels of «anti-civilian» behaviour (including tax evasion, clientelism, cor­
ruption and the like) among the elites as well as among the population.4
-  In Italy, but also in G reece, the danger of a take-over of pow er by strong 
communist parties was felt, particularly during the Fifties and Sixties.
Thus, in the  case of four m em bers of the  E u ro p ean  U nion, the motives for 
m em bership included the expectation that E uropean  integration would serve 
as an econom ic and political prop or crutch (see also Pfetsch 1997: 77ff.). In 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, m em bership was also m otivated according 
to official declarations by the desire to strengthen their democratic systems. In 
the cases of Portugal, Spain and Greece, this desire m eant nurturing young de­
mocracies after decades of authoritarian rule; in the case of Italy, it m eant de­
veloping m ore stable and civilised dem ocratic  conditions. A similar factor 
m ight also have been significant in the case of Belgium .5 B oth Belgium and 
Italy would certainly not have been able to reduce their budgets significantly if 
there had not been the strong pressure exerted by the prerequisite conditions 
for participation in the Euro. A  very nice parody on the tendency of the I ta ­
lians to expect the cure of all national ills from the E uropean  U nion and the 
E uro  was m ade by Giorgio Bocca (1998) [in his article «Santa Europa, bene- 
de tto  Euro» in: IlV enerdi della República, Supplem ento del giornale La R e­
pública, Rom a, 27.2.1998, p. 38].
The economic motive was also im portant for all of these countries. In view of 
the ir relative econom ic backw ardness, given a high p roportion  of relatively 
poor agrarian populations, countries like Portugal, G reece, and Ireland (and, 
to a lesser degree, Spain and Italy) expected, and to a large degree obtained, 
economic support from the Union for their underdeveloped areas. In the case
4 By referring  to  these negative aspects o f social and political life in Italy, I w ould riot like to discredit Italy or 
the Ita lians in general as being dishonest, .inefficient, etc.. R ather, as the  Swiss au thor V ictor Willi (1983) has 
show n in a very  nice book -  «Surviving in the  Ita lian  Way» -  m ost Ita lians are  characterised  by high levels 
of responsibility  and efficiency in carrying through the ir activities, even in spite o f adverse circumstances. In 
my view, the  m ain reason for the  high instability o f Ita lian  post-w ar governm ents, as well as for the high le­
vels o f co rru p tio n , was the  fact th a t the  C om m unist P arty  was n o t considered  as a «constitu tional party». 
T his had  the  consequence th a t th e  coalitions w hich w ere  fo rm ed  betw een  C hristian-conservatives, social 
dem ocrats  and  a few o th e r small cen tre  partie s  had  a m onopoly  on governm ent. U ntil th e  early  N ineties, 
these coalitions had a clear m ajority of the  votes in parliam entary  elections and w ere the refo re  able to  trea t 
political offices, as well as the b road  sector of politically contro lled  services and industries, as the ir own p ri­
vate  dom ain , in which posts  and  priv ileges w ere  d is tr ib u ted  m ainly  accord ing  to  party  in terests. See also 
R usconi (1993) for a discussion of the relationship  betw een national and E uropean  identity in Italy.
5 A m ong  possible reasons for the  relatively low sense o f national pride am ong Belgians, th ree  could be m en­
tioned: the  loss of their colonies; the ir quick defeat by Nazi troops in the  Second W orld W ar and the partial 
co llabo ra tion  o f Belgium  w ith N azi G erm any; and th e  d ee p  in ternal cleavage along linguistic-ethnic lines 
betw een the  Flem ish and the W allonian groups. T herese Jacobs (U niversity  of A ntw erp) suggested in a lec­
tu re  at the  U niversity  of G raz  (14.4.1998), how ever, th a t only the  last facto r plays a significant ro le  today. 
B elg ians, p a rticu la rly  F ren ch -sp eak in g  B elg ians, m igh t g ree t E u ro p e a n  in teg ra tio n  as a m eans o f o v e r­
com ing this division o f the country. The coun try ’s capital B russels especially profits directly from being the 
new  capital o f Europe.
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of Ireland, the reduction of its economic dependence on England was an addi­
tional incentive.6
If we look at some statistical indicators for the levels of developm ent and the 
net contributions of the different EU -m em ber states to the household of the 
European Union, we can see that a considerable net financial transfer is made 
to the four peripheral nations Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (see Table 
l ) .1 These four peripheral nations are also those which in the  early N ineties 
still had over 10% of their active populations employed in the agricultural sec­
tor; their general standard of living was clearly below the EU-mean.
Table 1: Indicators for the economic relevace of membership 
in the European Union to the m em ber states in 1991
Country % of Persons GNP in % Net contribution
employed in of the to the EU-budget
Agriculture EU-mean per head in ECU’s
(1986) (1995)
Great Britain
with North Ireland) 2,2 98,2 80,7
Denmark 5,2 112,0 -58,6
Germany 3,7 106,7 164,6
Belgium 2,9 110,4 30,6
France 5,9 107,2 29,6
Netherlands 3,7 100,4 129,7
Luxembourg 1,3 128,9 110,6
Italy 7,9 101,7 10,7
Ireland 13,7 85,2 -526,8
Spain 10,1 76,1 -184,0
Portugal 11,5 67,9 -241,8
Greece 21,8 60,6 -333,0
Austria 6,9 109,3 112,9
Sweden 3,4 95,3 105,5
Finnland 8,6 92,5 32,3
Source: Pfetsch (1997:177,260)
6 The m otive o f E uropean  in tegration  as a p rop  o r crutch to  help  solve dom estic p roblem s is also ev iden t in 
o th e r nation states. For exam ple, during  the  governm ental cam paign in A ustria for E U -m em bership , it was 
stated  openly, particularly  by big industrialists and the conservative party  Ö sterreichische V olkspartei, th a t 
m em bersh ip  o f the U nion  w ould oblige the  coun try  to  open  up  its ossified in s titu tiona l s truc tu res  and  to  
adap t to  a m ore  com petitive environm ent (see also H aller 1994).
7 O therw ise only D enm ark , with its significant b u t ra th e r m odern ised  agrarian  secto r, gains from  E U -m em ­
bersh ip  by receiving d irect transfers.
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It is therefore not difficult to understand why the «official» attitudes toward 
m em bership of the E uropean U nion were and still are very positive in these 
five countries. These attitudes are evidently supported by their populations at 
large. If we look at the findings of the E urobarom eter surveys concerning pub­
lic approval of E uropean  in tegration, we find that it is precisely the popula­
tions of these five countries which are shown to be those m ost in favour (see 
Table 2). In Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, a clear m ajority of the 
respective populations -  nearly  tw o-thirds in each case -  approves of the ir 
country being an EU-m em ber; abqut 80% think that the m embership of their 
country is «a good thing» and has been to their advantage; 70-80% think that 
E uropean citizenship would be a good thing. These sentiments are statistically 
significantly higher than the findings for most other European nations.
There is another indication of the convergence betw een the aims and s tra te­
gies of these countries at the macro-level, and the micro-level of the very posi­
tive attitudes of their individual citizens. This is the fact that the political elites 
of none of the four South-European countries felt it necessary to put the issue 
of EC- or EU -m em bership to  a public vote or referendum  (see Synopsis 2). 
H ad they done so, they would probably have obtained results similar to those 
in Ireland, where a referendum  about the ratification of the Treaty of M aast­
richt won a two-thirds m ajority in 1993. B efore this vote, Irish political elites 
were eager to present the advantages of EU -m em bership to their citizens in 
the most brilliant colours.
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Synopsis 2: Results of Referenda in 9 European countries and regions resp.
concerning the joining to the European Community/Union and 
the acceptation of the Treaties of M aastricht
Year Country and topic of Referendum Result
Positive decisions
02.10.1972 Denmark: joining the EC majority in favour
05.06.1975 Great Britain: remaining in the EC 68% in favour
26.05.1987 Ireland: ratification of the European Act majority in favour
18.06.1992 Ireland: ratification of the Treaties 
of Maastricht
68.7% in favour
1992 France: ratification of the Treaties 
of Maastricht
majority in favour
18.05.1993 Denmark, second referendum about
Treaties of Maastricht 56.8% in favour
12.06.1994 Austria: joining of the EU 66.5% in favour
16.10.1994 Finnland: joining of the EU 57% in favour
13.11.1994 Sweden: joining of the EU 52% in favour
Negative decisions
26.09.1992 Norway: joining of the EU majority against
23.02.1982 Greenland (autonomous region of 
Denmark): remaining in the EU
majority against
02.06.1992 Denmark: acceptation of the Treaties 
of Maastricht
68.7% against
06.12.1992 Switzerland: joining of the 
European Economic Area (EWR)
50% against
27./28.11.1994 Norway: joining of the EU 52.2% against
Source: Pfetsch 1(997:290 ff.)
2.2 European integration as a necessary evil
There is at least one large nation state in which European integration is clearly 
not seen as a positive goal in and of itself, but as something which nevertheless 
cannot be avoided in the long run because in that case, negative consequences 
would have to  be accepted. This state is Great Britain; to a lesser degree, the 
Scandinavian states also fit into this category. It is well known that the official 
aims and actions of British E uropean  politics have changed several times. 
There are at least three reasons for this: (1) historically, Britain was at the cen­
tre  of its own large Com m onw ealth em pire, and it still m aintains close ties
280 Max Haller
with Canada, Australia and New Zealand; (2) Britain also m aintains particu­
larly close ties with the U nited States, ties which are based on a common cul­
tural heritage and intensive economic, social, cultural-scientific and political 
relations; (3) their trad ition  of econom ic and political liberalism , as well as 
their old and well-established dem ocratic system, make Britons suspicious of 
any strongly centralised political and comprehensive welfare system.
B ritain’s official policy towards Europe after World War II began with W ins­
ton C hurchill’s fam ous speech at the U niversity of Zurich in 1947. In this 
speech, Churchill asked for a united Europe which would secure the peace on 
the Continent; but Britain was not seen as being part of this alliance. Again, 
the foundation of the European Economic Community of the Six in the mid- 
Fifties took place without Britain. It was only in the Sixties that British E uro­
pean policy changed significantly. But even then, it was defined as «a policy of 
the last resort» (Pfetsch 1997: 74). The European Community was seen as a ne­
cessary new partner for trade, because B ritain’s relationships with the form er 
colonies (or Com m onwealth partners) had changed drastically, to the disad­
vantage of Britain. A t the same time, the increasing econom ic pow er of the 
Com m unity m ade it clear to the British tha t they would lose influence in 
Europe if they did not join the EC. However, French President de Gaulle then 
blocked British entrance to the Community. In 1971, a new vote in the British 
parliam ent brought a majority in favour of joining the EC, although the votes 
of the Commons were rather divided (59% pro). A referendum  in 1975 obtai­
ned a surprisingly high percentage (68% ) in favour. But once m ore, in the 
Eighties, many objections were raised to British EC-membership, this time by 
Prime Minister M argaret Thatcher. She argued strongly for Europe as «a fami­
ly of nations» as opposed to an integrated federal state. This position led to ad­
ditional protocols in the Treaties of M aastricht in respect of B rita in’s special 
position. As far as social policy and the m onetary union are concerned, Britain 
is not obliged to adhere com pletely to the in tegration process. A m ore pro- 
European attitude, however, has been evident since 1997 with the new Labour 
government of Tony Blair.
In the case of Britain, then, EU -m em bership is not som ething which Britons 
think is absolutely necessary for their country. This is clearly reflected in sur­
vey data. The British are characterised by a rather high level of national pride; 
they are particularly proud of the working of democracy in their country, of 
their armed forces, and of their history (see Table 3); and they feel much closer 
to their nation state than to Europe (Table 4). In the mean, only a strong m i­
nority of 40% of the population  -  the lowest p roportion  of any of the EU - 
m ember states -  approves of Britain being an EU-m em ber (Table 2).
Voiceless Submission or Deliberate Choice? 281
CDT3
’Ca,
'cSc_o
'SG
—3
£
C\J CO CN
CNJ CO CM
N - CD CO
0) F jii 
8 1 ? ^
E .Ç g w g 
i  i  i  i  »
5  a3 a) a)
6 E £ E ®It W ÿ !P (D
ecu 95 a? ;= .? £  !c !c «
O O 
CO TO < < cc
TO sp
3OCO *
D
iff
er
en
ce
 
be
tw
ee
n 
lo
w
es
t 
an
d 
hi
gh
es
t 
va
lu
e
282 Max Haller
Table 4: Feeling of closeness to different territorial units in 12 countries
Feel «very close» or «close to ...» (in %)
Country Neighbour­
hood
Town / 
City
Province State 
(very close)
Europe
(America)
Austria 81 51 86 (55) 89 66
Germany (West) 67 48 58 (22) 73 50
Germany (East) 69 45 67 (26) 76 49
Italy 68 82 79 (43) 87 67
Great Britain 60 50 44 (21) 63 19
Slowenia 77 77 94 (49) 92 65
Hungary 79 84 86 (79) 97 94
Czech Republic 78 72 66 (46) 89 73
Poland 69 72 60 (53) 92 63
Sweden 63 63 65 (32) 81 35
Norway 51 69 78 (51) 94 54
Spain 88 92 91 (43) 89 62
USA 57 60 62 (35) 81 59
Mean 70 66 72 (43) 85 58
(N) (907) (865) (936) (555) (1103) (756)
Source: ISSP-95.
A somewhat similar attitude toward the European Union can be seen among 
several Scandinavian countries. These countries are today, in economic terms, 
among the wealthiest countries in the world. A t the same time, they are proud 
of their welfare and social security systems, which have achieved a considera­
ble equalization of life chances and the virtual elim ination of open poverty, 
and these facts are reflected in rather high levels of national pride (see Table
3). But Scandinavians are also quite proud of their democracies and history. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that Norwegians and Swedes are more attached to 
their nation state than to Europe as a whole (see Table 4). The data for D en­
mark, which -  as an older EU -m em ber -  is also found in the E urobarom eter 
surveys, show the second lowest level of attachm ent to the E uropean Union 
among the twelve member states (see Table 2).
A nother factor which tended to make Finland and Sweden sceptical for a long 
time about the E uropean  U nion was their position of political neu trality  in 
foreign affairs. It was thought, especially as long as E urope was divided into 
two hostile camps (East versus West), that neutrality was not compatible with 
membership of the European Community, as the EC maintains close ties with 
America and the military alliance NATO.8
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2.3 European integration as the creation of a new kind of bureaucratised 
super-state
The sort of critical stance towards the European U nion displayed by Britain 
and Scandinavia, is even more pronounced in the cases of two small European 
nation states which have so far officially rejected m em bership of the EC/EU. 
These two states are Norway and Switzerland. In Norway, the population has 
twice rejected joining the European Union, in 1992 and again in 1994. In Swit­
zerland, even the question of joining the European Economic A rea was rejec­
ted by a small majority in 1992 (see Synopsis 2). W hat were the reasons for the 
critical attitudes of the populations (not the elites!) in these two countries?
In the case of Norway, the main reasons were probably the same as those 
which inhibited Finland and Sweden for a long time from joining the E uro ­
pean Community (political neutrality, a strong welfare state, a high standard of 
living). In addition, though, we might m ention the high revenues which N or­
way gets from N orth Sea oil, providing this country with considerable econo­
mic strength, at the very time when Finland and Sweden ran into serious eco­
nomic difficulties, albeit for different reasons.9
In the case of Switzerland, factors sim ilar to those influencing Britain might 
account for the negative attitudes toward European integration. In the first in­
stance, pride in the history of the country and the well-established federal and 
democratic system must be taken into account. Unlike Britain, however, Swit­
zerland did not experience an economic decline in the post-war years -  rather 
the opposite. In spite of the small size of this country, the Swiss Franken is one 
of the strongest currencies in the world. We can probably also say tha t the 
strong sense of national identity  am ong the Swiss is second to none in 
E urope.101 would argue that the resistance, particularly of the population of 
the G erm an-speaking rural cantons, was not in the first instance (as many 
com m entators would have it) an expression of backwardness, but a well-foun- 
ded fear that local democracy and national political autonomy would be signi­
8 A strong  a ttach m en t to  political neu tra lity  was also  one of m ost im p ortan t reasons for th e  scepticism  of 
m any A ustrians abou t E C -m em bership . This positive evaluation of neu trality  still exists, bu t is declining in 
th e  face o f a susta ined  p ro p ag an d a  cam paign  aga inst it, p e rp e tra te d  by the  political e lites in pow er (see 
H aller et al. 1996: 501 ff.). It m ust be adm itted , how ever, tha t the m eaning and function of political n eu tra ­
lity has changed since th e  collapse of th e  Iron  C urta in , increasing E u ropean  in tegration , and g lobalisation 
(K riesi 1998:27 ff.).
9 F inland because o f the collapse o f its close econom ic relations w ith the fo rm er Soviet U nion , Sweden b e ­
cause of a sudden  change in currency policy and an overloading  o f the w elfare state, due to  high increases 
of wages (see Jochem  1998).
10 U nfortunately , we do n o t have stric tly  com parab le  survey data  on this topic, because Sw itzerland is not a 
m em ber of the  In ternational Social Survey P rogram m e (ISSP), ne ither are the E u roba rom ete r surveys con­
ducted  there.
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ficantly undermined by joining the E U  (see Kriesi 1998: 90 ff., for a systematic 
discussion of the Swiss system of direct democracy).11
2.4 European integration as a substitute for a weak sense of national identity
A pattern which is almost the opposite of that in Switzerland can be observed 
in the case of Germany. The present-day Germans are characterised by a com­
paratively low level of national pride. It is, in fact, the lowest level among the 
26 countries exam ined in the study on N ational Identity  conducted  by the 
International Social Science Survey Programme (ISSP) in 1995, and one of the 
lowest in the World Value Survey of 1990 (see also Westle 1992). Table 3 shows 
tha t G erm ans both in the East and the West have by far the lowest pride in 
their history and arm ed forces. The low level of G erm an national p ride is 
clearly the product of two historical facts: (1) G erm an responsibility for the 
outbreak of the Second World War, and their total defeat in this war; (2) G er­
m an responsibility for the H olocaust, the system atic genocide of nearly  six 
million Jews in the concentration camps. Consciousness of this crime remains a 
painful traum a for many G erm ans today. This issue continues to be debated  
hotly and strongly in the German public arena12 (for further evidence, see von 
Krockow 1970; G reiffenhagen 1979; Burum a 1994). We must say, indeed, that 
G erm any is still today an «ashamed nation.»13 This thesis is supported by the 
fact that the Italians, who were also defeated in World War II, also have a low 
sense of pride in their army, but a rather high feeling of pride in their history; 
the latter is similarly true for Austria.14
Looking at the data concerning the identification of Germans with Europe, we 
cannot say tha t they are as enthusiastic as the first group of countries discus­
sed above. The data on the identification with different territorial units (Table
4) as well as those on their identification with the European Union (Table 2),
11 This anxiety w ould be seen to  be entirely  justified  w ere we to  com pare the  exam ple o f A ustria  a fte r it jo i­
ned the EU. In th e  A ustrian  parliam ent, hundreds and hund reds of decisions had to  be  taken  alm ost o ver­
night, in o rder to  enact E U -law  in A ustria. Today, it is said th a t 70-80%  of all political decisions w hich affect 
A ustria are taken  in Brussels.
12 O ne of the m ost recen t instances was the publication of D an ie l G o ldhagen ’s book on the a ttitudes and be­
haviour of o rd inary  G erm ans concerning the H olocaust (G oldhagen  1996).
13 In G erm an political science litera ture, a heated  discussion abou t this designation has taken  p lace during the 
last few years. T he w ell-known social scientist E lisabeth  N oelle-N eum ann (N oelle-N eum ann/K ocher 1987) 
has used  the te rm  «verletzte  N ation» («hu rt na tion»), w hich I th ink  is m isleading  in this regard , how ever, 
since G erm any was not hurt by others but by its own national socialist regim e, w hich was guilty of com m it­
ting crimes against the Jews. (See Scheff 1994 abo u t the  im portance  arid exact m ean ing  o f the concepts of 
«pride» and «shame».)
14 See H aller e t al. 1996 for a system atic com parison betw een G erm any  and Italy, and H aller 1999b fo r a com ­
parison betw een A ustria and Germany.
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show that the G erm ans have only an in term ediate  level of a ttachm ent to 
Europe. In a com parative analysis of national pride in G erm any and Italy, I 
correlated the feeling of belonging to different geographic-political units (lo­
cal/regional/national/European identity) with national pride (Haller 1999b). It 
was found in the case of G erm any that those respondents who identified 
themselves in the first instance with «Europe» or with «the world as a whole» 
were characterised by a low level of national pride,15 but the same was not true 
for Italy. Thus, we can say that at least for a significant subgroup of the G er­
man population, the identification with E urope constitutes a substitute for a 
low sense of national identity and pride.
2.5 European integration as a positive vehicle for the realisation of particular 
econom ic, political and/or cultural interests
U nder this rubric, I would include three kinds of ideas and strategies. The first 
concerns the realisation of positive econom ic goals and interests. In this 
connection, it is quite evident from the perspective of contem porary history 
that the interests of large enterprises and m ultinational corporations have ta­
ken the lead in the breakthrough of European economic integration since the 
early Eighties. This is clearly shown in a comprehensive recent study by Volker 
B ornschier and associates (1999; see also M iddlem as 1995). The E uropean  
R ound Table of Industrialists, established in 1983, which included all the major 
E uropean  transnational and m ultinational corporations (Philips, Siemens, 
Shell, O livetti, etc.) developed very concrete ideas and proposals about how 
E urope should m eet the challenge presented by the U nited States and Japan 
on the world economic scene. The ideas of this R ound Table were largely ta ­
ken over by the EU -Com m ission and its p resident, Jacques Delors, in the 
White B ook fo r  the Internal Market, published in 1985. In this pam phlet, the 
future shape of a fully free m arket in E urope was very clearly laid out in its 
principal characteristics.
There is one small member state of the European Union which fits particular­
ly well into this pattern. This is Luxembourg, whose entire economy, but espe­
cially its banking sector, profits massively from European integration. D ue to 
specific advantageous conditions, the private and corporate  m oneyed ari­
stocracy from the neighbouring countries prefers to invest money in this small
15 In 1988, only 9%  of the responden ts who identified in the first instance with E urope, w ere «very proud» of 
G erm any  while, in th e  w hole sam ple, this p ro p o rtio n  was a b o u t 25% ; in this subgroup, th e  p rop o rtio n  of 
those with «no pride» in G erm any was 56% (in th e  w hole sam ple about 30% ).
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country or to establish puppet com panies there  in o rder to evade taxes and 
other public burdens and restrictions.16
Besides Luxembourg, this motive of using the E U  as a vehicle for the realisa­
tion of the interests of big enterprises and capital is certainly re levan t for 
every European country which hosts such companies. This applies particularly 
to Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Italy.
A second positive aim (or group of aims) connected with E uropean  in tegra­
tion is political. The dominant aim here was, in the Fifties, clearly that of main­
taining in ternal peace betw een the m em ber states, particularly  betw een 
France and Germany. The close and friendly relationship that was established 
betw een these two core E uropean countries was an epochal achievem ent of 
several political personalities, including Charles de Gaulle and Konrad A den­
auer. In more recent times, this aim has been enlarged to include that of provi­
ding the European Union with more concerted power to effect foreign policy 
and relations with other countries and regions of the world. It is quite evident 
that, once again, this aim is supported primarily by the larger member states of 
the EU, notably Germany, France and, belatedly, G reat Britain. By uniting the 
armed forces of the fifteen m em ber states, the European U nion could, at least 
in theory, play a significant role in world politics. In this way, it could com pen­
sate these middle-sized nations for the loss of their form er world pow er and 
influence. It should come as no surprise, then, that from  tim e to tim e po liti­
cians from these countries ask for a common military force in the EU, or even 
attem pt to establish a small European corps.
A  third and final aim of the European Union may be called the realisation of 
a cultural vision. H ere, E urope is seen as a cultural unit, stem m ing from the 
M iddle Ages when the Rom an Catholic church extended over and united al­
m ost the whole con tinen t.17 From  that tim e on, this concept of a C hristian 
Europe («Abendland», as against the pagan O rient) has been a politically con­
tentious but potent symbol (Faber 1979). The success of post-war economic in­
tegration can only be fully appreciated if we recognise the fact that the «Euro­
pean Idea» has really been current for centuries (Swedberg 1994).
16 This certain ly  also app lies to  S w itzerland  (see Z ieg le r 1992). S ince S w itze rland ’s en try  to  the  E U  w ould 
bring  an end to  som e of the advantages w hich it enjoys th rough  these m eans, this could be  an o th er reason  
for the negative E U -attitudes  of som e Swiss people.
17 I am aw are th a t this «cultural» o r «religious unity» o f the E u ro p ean  O ccident did no t preclude m any con­
flicts betw een  th e  severa l C hristian  kings. O n occasion , they  (no tab ly  the  F rench  kings, w ho w ere  consi­
stently in opposition to  the G erm an em perors of the H oly R om an Em pire) even en tered  into alliances with 
pagan rulers, such as the Turkish Sultans.
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All of these three concepts and aims associated with European integration are 
most prom inent in the central European nation states, particularly in France 
and Germany, and to a lesser extent also in the Benelux nations and in Italy. 
The largest m ultinational corporations of the EU  are located in these coun­
tries. Some of these countries, again m ost notably France and Germany, have 
also played central roles in European and world history as major powers, sub­
sequently experiencing decline in this sphere. M oreover, with few exceptions 
(Netherlands, North and East Germ any), Catholic Christians constitute a m a­
jority of the population in these countries, and Catholicism can be considered 
historically as having been the «dominant religion». It is not surprising, there­
fore, that we find solid majorities approving of European integration in all of 
these countries (see Table 2).
If we consider the role of Catholicism in particular, we find an additional ex­
planation for some surprising findings. It is possible that Catholicism is a reli­
gion which can contribute to a more positive attitude toward European in te­
gration, because among o ther things: (1) Catholicism  is a universal religion, 
thus supporting international co-operation and integration; and (2) the Roman 
Catholic Church is a strongly centralised and hierarchical organisation. Both 
of these facts would suggest that Catholics will be less afraid than Protestants 
of a new central EU-bureaucracy in Brussels. This effect of religion could also 
explain the essentially positive attitudes of A ustrians and Italians. G erm an 
Catholics, too, have traditionally had a positive attitude toward European inte­
gration (Langner 1985). The thesis that Catholicism predisposes towards a po­
sitive integration attitude is also confirm ed by the fact that the leading G er­
man politicians in E uropean  in tegration  w ere C atholics or came from  the 
South-W est C atholic regions of G erm any (K. A denauer, W. H allstein , H. 
Kohl).
W hat would a «Catholic European Union» look like? It would be: (1) strongly 
centralised, bureaucratised, hierarchically structured; (2) a very well integrated 
and comprehensive welfare state, effectively reducing inequalities and pover­
ty; (3) a paternalistic-elitist state whose citizens were well provided for in m a­
terial terms, but had few interests, possibilities, or powers in political terms. In 
short, it would be a new kind of «mild to talitarian  state», as was foreseen by 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1976).
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3 C o n clud ing  rem arks
In concluding, I shall point out some of the implications of the widely differing 
images and expectations concerning the European U nion and its identity, in 
relation to three of the aforem entioned functions of European integration.
European integration as a prop or crutch: Will E uropean  in tegration  really 
help the Southern and peripheral European nations in economic and political 
term s? W hat will be the consequence of the inclusion of these countries, and 
also in the foreseeable future of the form er communist nations of E ast-C en­
tral Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia), for the 
E uropean  U nion as a whole? In econom ic terms, it is a fact tha t Ireland has 
profited considerably from integration. As far as the peripheral South E u ro ­
pean nations and regions are concerned, however, the picture is much less clear. 
But as a comparison, it might be observed, for example, that almost one hun­
dred years of considerable support by Italian  governm ents for the M ezzo- 
giorno have not really brought Southern Italy much closer to the high level of 
development in N orthern Italy.
This situation in Italy could be replicated in Europe, namely, a spillover of in­
ternal problems to the whole Union. The persistence of corruption in Italy is 
closely related to central governm ent support for the South (as well as for 
state-owned and state-controlled enterprises which are very im portant in Italy, 
but also in France). Corruption in its less openly criminal forms of clientelism, 
patronage, favouritism, etc. is an endemic feature of m odern societies. It flou­
rishes particularly in m arket societies where transactions are no longer con­
trolled by primordial units but where an open flow of resources and opportu ­
nities exists together with an increasing inequality of access to the m arket and 
socio-political sphere18 (R oniger 1994: 8; R oniger/G tines-A yata 1994). Two 
tendencies are relevant here: first, the massive increase of the sphere of state 
activities in all W estern dem ocracies and the increasing com plexity of deci­
sion-making processes; second, the differential capacities of access to the spon­
soring activities (Fordertopfe) at the level of the European Union. It was p ro ­
bably not pure chance that in 1998, an Italian and a French EU-Com m issioner 
were involved in dubious financial transactions and in the haggling for well- 
paid jobs within the EU -bureaucracy. Even m ore problem atic in my view is
18 «C lientelistic relations»  are defined  as being  «built around  asym m etric but m utually  beneficial and  open- 
ended transactions and predicated  on the differential control by social actors over the access and flow o f re ­
sources in s tra tif ie d  socie ties ... B asically , c lien te lism  c rea tes  an in h e ren tly  c o n trad ic to ry  s itu a tio n . 
A sym m etrical pow er and/or inequality  is com bined with solidarity, and potentia l and/or actual coerc ion  co­
exists w ith an ideological em phasis .on  the  v o lun tary  n a tu re  of th e  a ttachm en t.»  (R o n ig e r/G iin es-A y a ta  
1994: 3f.)
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another fact: the respected British newspaper Financial Times, which detected 
and criticised these practices, was taken  to court and charged by EU -bu- 
reaucrats for publishing its enquiry!
Europe as a substitute fo r  a weak sense o f  national identity. This function of 
m em bership  in the E uropean  U nion was quite obvious in the case of G er­
many, but I see two problems here. First, from the democratic point of view, it 
is disturbing that to date Germans have never had an opportunity to vote in a 
referendum  about such a far-reaching inclusion of their political system within 
a new, larger unit which in fact considerably underm ines their national action 
potential. As in the case of all the o ther m em ber states of the EU, we cannot 
say w hether the possibility of G erm ans being able to elect deputies to the 
E uropean Parliam ent would be an adequate com pensation for the significant 
loss of impact of the Bundestag.
Second, since the high level of in tegration and stability in present-day G er­
many ultim ately does not depend on the economic prosperity of the country, 
negative economic events or trends could significantly affect the attitudes of 
the G erm an population toward European integration. In this respect, the high 
net financial transfers to other m em ber states and the high symbolic value of 
the D eutsche M ark pose particular problem s (see M artin 1991). It could be­
come very problem atic if Germans began to see that redistribution within the 
European Union helps to strengthen a bureaucratic and corrupt apparatus. A 
problem  could also arise if the Euro were to become less stable than the DM.
Inherent conflicts between different functions o f  European integration, and bet­
ween the interests o f  elites and people: I have argued that in the cases of some 
nation states, social and economic groups, we can say that European integra­
tion was in fact m ore or less consciously planned for and pursued. This raises 
two questions: have the aims of integration been achieved so far? Do conflicts 
exist between the different aims or between the actors and the people at large?
Econom ic in tegration, the liberalisation of m arkets, and the in troduction of 
the com m on currency, significantly reduce the potential of the single nation 
states to pursue autonomous and effective economic and social policies. A t the 
same time, the development of a new welfare state at the EU-level is not yet in 
sight, nor even imaginable. The American writer John Newhouse has shown in 
his recent book, Europe A drift (1997/98), that the M aastricht treaty was an in­
com plete com prom ise betw een France and England on the one side, and 
G erm any on the o ther side. The first two countries and their political rep re­
sentatives (particularly President M itterand, who was at first openly opposed 
to G erm an reunification) w anted to in troduce m onetary union in order to
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control Germ any’s economic power. Germany, under Chancellor Kohl, wanted 
to introduce a political union. Only the first goal was achieved. The conse­
quence is that the European Union in its present form is a torso -  a structure 
with strong economic and m arket integration, but no corresponding in tegra­
tion of domestic and foreign policy.
A new European technocratic elite is coming into existence which is very re ­
m ote from the daily life of the citizens in their hom e nations and regions 
(Bach 1999). It is not well known that 90% of the political decisions in B rus­
sels are taken not by the Council of M inisters -  the direct represen tatives of 
the single nation states -  but by a very small com m ittee called C O R E P E R  
(Comité des R eprésentants Permanents): this group prepares all the decisions 
which the Council of Ministers makes. Since the members of the Commission
-  the «acting government» of the EU  -  are also appointed by national govern­
ments, none of the most influential groups and authorities at the central level 
of the EU  are elected in a democratic process.
A nother serious problem  exists with the objective of preserving the high de­
gree of cultural differentiation within Europe -  in the first instance, the variety 
of languages -  while at the same time attem pting to resolve the considerable 
im balances caused by the relative sizes and degrees of pow er of the  consti­
tuent nation states within the E uropean Union. No single federal state in the 
world -  from G erm any and Switzerland, to Canada and the U nited States -  is 
characterised by such a high degree of internal differentiation and size and po­
wer im balances betw een its subunits (H aller 1.992). As long as these rem ain 
the only constituent units of the E uropean  Union -  and there is no expecta­
tion that they will be replaced as such -  a balanced pow er structure is hardly 
possible.
All of these facts -  the tendency to underm ine national political autonomy, the 
weak developm ent of dem ocratic processes at the level of central authorities 
in the EU, the large gaps between the national level and the level of European 
institutions in Brussels, Strasbourg and elsewhere -  could help to explain why, 
throughout most of Europe, there is very little enthusiasm for E uropean  inte­
gration (Giesen 1993; Immerfall/Sobisch 1997). Nevertheless, I would not like 
to argue that E uropean integration as a whole is a problem atic undertaking. 
As an example of an integration process tha t was successful in the long run, 
we could m ention the U nited  States, which were deeply divided betw een 
N orth  and South in social and cultural term s until the late 19th C entury .191
19 O ne could well ask, though, w hether the national unification of the U SA  (and the according o f equa l status 
to  the  blacks) was w orth  th e  ex trem ely  b loody  civil w ar o f 1861-65, in which over 600000 p eo p le  d ied . I 
w ould answer this question with a «No».
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would argue, however, first, that we must see the European integration process 
much m ore critically than the actors involved seem to see it, and second, that 
we should invest m ore time and energy in thinking about institutional struc­
tures which are appropria te  and adapted  to this extrem ely variegated and 
complex entity which is called «the European Union».
Can we give an answer to the  general question w hether a truly E uropean  
identity  will develop among the people of this continent? I would be rather 
sceptical if we were to think here simply of feelings of attachm ent comparable 
to those expressive of a national identity. The European Union is obviously a 
much larger, abstract, and complex entity than any single nation state. The EU 
cannot rely on a common history and on shared and venerated symbols, as na­
tion  states can do. N one of this necessarily presents a problem , however, as 
long as the U nion keeps clearly to its character as a com m unity of nations 
which does not seek to regulate the daily lives of its citizens in every detail and 
to becom e one of the power-players on the world scene. As a com paratively 
loose union of relatively independent nation states, it can fulfil im portant and 
useful instrum ental functions for its constituent units. A n attachm ent to the 
U nion as an entity which is more instrum ental and neutral, but overall posi­
tive, could well go hand-in-hand with a stronger emotionally based, but demysti­
fied sense of national identity for Europeans.20
20 For am ple evidence showing tha t chauvinistic form s of national identity  are declining in E urope , see D ogan 
(1994).
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